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Abstract
We analyze the euro area business cycle in a medium scale DSGE model where we assume
two stochastic trends: one on total factor productivity and one on the inﬂation target of the
central bank. To justify our choice of integrated trends, we test alternative speciﬁcations for
both of them. We do so, estimating trends together with the model's structural parameters,
to prevent estimation biases.
In our estimates, business cycle ﬂuctuations are dominated by investment speciﬁc shocks
and preference shocks of households. Our results cast doubts on the view that cost push
shocks dominate economic ﬂuctuations in DSGE models and show that productivity shocks
drive ﬂuctuations on a longer term.
As a conclusion, we present our estimation's historical reading of the business cycle in the
euro area. This estimation gives credible explanations of major economic events since 1985.
JEL-classiﬁcation : E32;
Keywords: New Keynesian model, Business Cycle, Bayesian estimation.
Résumé
Nous analysons les ﬂuctuations du cycle économique en Zone Euro dans le cadre d'un modèle
DSGE comprenant deux tendances stochastiques, une sur la productivité globale des fac-
teurs et l'autre sur la cible d'inﬂation. Pour justiﬁer notre choix de tendances intégrées,
nous testons des spéciﬁcations diﬀérentes pour chacune d'elles. Aﬁn d'éviter des biais dans
l'estimation, nous estimons conjointement les tendances et les paramètres structurels du
modèle.
Nos estimations montrent que les ﬂuctuations du cycle économique sont principalement
expliquées par des chocs spéciﬁques d'investissement et des chocs de préférence des ménages.
Nos résultats mettent en défaut l'idée que les chocs de mark-up sont les principaux vecteurs
des ﬂuctuations économiques dans les modèles DSGE et montrent que les chocs de produc-
tivité expliquent les ﬂuctuations de long terme.
En conclusion, nous présentons une relecture historique du cycle économique en zone euro
à l'aune de notre estimation. Cette estimation donne une explication crédible des événements
économiques majeurs depuis 1985.
Classiﬁcation JEL: E32;
Mots clés: Modèle néo-keynésien, estimation bayésienne, cycle économique.
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Introduction
DSGE models provide a mapping between observable variables and the structural shocks
on the business cycle. Usually, this literature attributes a linchpin role to price and wage
mark-up shocks in cyclical ﬂuctuations. This decomposition is however highly sensitive to
the treatment of the observables. We add two unit roots to the Smets and Wouters (2003)
model and do not use employment level as a proxy for hours worked. Doing so, we improve
the ﬁt to the data, we signiﬁcantly increase internal persistence of the model while shocks
exhibit low persistence, and we ﬁnd a convincing identiﬁcation of shocks replicating major
economic historical episodes of the euro area.
Indeed, while the most widely estimation approach was to de-trend variables before the
estimation of the model's parameters, Gorodnichenko an Ng (2009) show that a potential
mispeciﬁcation of the trend can imply sizeable estimation biases. Besides, Ferroni (2008)
underlines that a one step estimation of both the trend and the cycle, provides a better
ﬁt to the data and avoids estimations biases. This paper therefore undertakes a one step
estimation of the trend and the structural parameters of the Smets-Wouters model. This
uniﬁcation of trend and cycle inside a same framework allows for the reconstruction of non
stationary variables using DSGE techniques. We use a model of closed economy for the
euro area, following Christiano et al. (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2003). We assume
stochastic trends on Total Factor Productivity (TFP) and on inﬂation target. The TFP
is modeled with an integrated process with drift while the inﬂation trend is modeled by a
random walk on the central banker inﬂation target (Ireland (2008)). Once linearized, this
model is estimated using GDP, private consumption, private investment, wages, inﬂation,
and interest rate times series from 1985 to 2008 for the euro area. We adopt a one-step
approach and simultaneously extract the trend and estimate the model. To carry out the
estimation, we use a standard approach of partial calibration and partial Bayesian estimation.
This estimation approach yields three results. First, the trends on real variables and
inﬂation are better modeled with ﬁrst order integrated processes than with autoregressive
processes. Second, the contribution to the cycle of the shocks generating the trends is weak.
Indeed, the productivity shocks have two eﬀects in our framework. They modify the con-
temporaneous value of the trend, through the integrated component of TFP. They can also
inﬂuence the stationary variables, i.e. drive the business cycle. The unit root makes the real
trend slowly ﬂuctuate around its deterministic trajectory, but at business cycle frequencies,
the impact on the business cycle is clearly dominated by other shocks. Hence, our results
contrast those obtained by standard RBC results (e.g. King and Rebelo, 1999). Business
cycles appear dominated by preference shocks and investment speciﬁc shocks. Particularly,
we side with Greenwood et al. (2000), Fisher (2006) and Justiniano et al. (2008) in showing
that investment speciﬁc shocks plays a crucial role in the business cycle. It is therefore likely
that the importance of cost push shocks, identiﬁed as a DSGE weakness by Chari et al.
(2009) could be due to estimation biases. Third, we estimate much lower persistence of the
shocks, i.e. of the exogenous persistence of the model. We therefore address one of the most
frequent criticisms of estimated DSGE models which have insuﬃcient "internal propagation
to replicate the dynamics of the data" (Canova, 2007).
Other authors have introduced real or nominal trend in their models. Smets and Wouters
(2005, 2007) use linear trend on TFP. In Smets and Wouters (2003), while real variables
are ﬁltered with an HP-ﬁlter, they introduced an AR(1) inﬂation target. Ireland (2008) has
introduced unit roots on the inﬂation target and TFP for a US model without capital, and
Fève, Matheron and Sahuc (2008) did the same for the euro area. Yet, none of them compare
the results under alternative speciﬁcations. Ferroni (2008) did so on US data, but only for
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the TFP trend. He uses the Smets and Wouters model but he "considers oﬀ model trends",
i.e. agents are making decisions with regard to the deviation from the trend wether it is
deterministic or stochastic. Here, we are able to test the two alternatives of integrated or
autoregressive trends on both the TFP and the inﬂation target. Moreover we do not make
an "oﬀ model trends" assumption, allowing for a stochastic trend to be taken into account
in the agents decisions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section 1 brieﬂy exposes the set up
of our DSGE model, section 2 presents the estimation method and data, section 3 details the
trend speciﬁcation and deﬁnes the cycle, section 4 presents our results on the shocks driving
the cycle while section 5 conducts an historical review of the Euro Area to test our shocks
identiﬁcation consistency with stylized facts.
1 A DSGE model with two unit roots
We consider a closed economy with a continuum of inﬁnitely-lived households who maximize
their utility under a set of constraints. They provide diﬀerentiated labor skills, which are
aggregated by a labor agency as in Erceg et al (2000). As in Christiano et al. (2005), house-
holds own capital which they decide to rent to ﬁrms and we impose a rigidity on capital
adjustment and on the capital utilization rate. We distinguish an intermediate sector that
operates under imperfect competition à la Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) from the ﬁnal sector produc-
ing a good used by private and public agents to consume or invest. We add nominal rigidities
on prices and wages à la Calvo (1983) as in Smets and Wouters (2003). The departure from
the baseline model is the addition of two stochastic trends following Fève et al. (2008) who
introduce the same trends in a model with no capital.
We add a TFP trend, modeled as an integrated process with a drift, to account for eco-
nomic growth. For monetary policy matters, we add an integrated inﬂation target to account
for the change in monetary policy directed toward the convergence to low inﬂation levels up
to the mid 1990s and a constant inﬂation target afterwards. Hence our model is compatible
with long term growth and inﬂation, in other words with real and nominal trends. Moreover
it takes into account the eﬀect of these two trends on the cycle. While productivity shocks
make a contribution to the cycle, the inﬂation target of the central banker is introduced as
a monetary policy tool used by other agents in the indexation of prices.
In contrast to Smets and Wouters (2003 and 2007), we do not include two shocks: a shock
on labor desutility, which can not be diﬀerentiated from the wage mark-up in the linearized
model (see Chari et al. (2009)) and a not microfounded shock on the risk premium. These
two shocks only account for a negligible part of economic ﬂuctuations in their estimation.
We also eliminate the ﬁxed cost in the intermediary sector. In the remainder of this section,
we brieﬂy recall the main features of the model.
Households
Households, indexed by τ , maximize their utility deﬁned as:
E0
∞∑
0
βtεBt
(
log(Cτt − hCt−1)−
lτt
1+ 1σl
1 + 1σl
+ Υ(mτt )
)
(1)
where E0 is the expectations operator at time zero; Ct, lt,mt are respectively, private con-
sumption, hours worked and real balances; β is the discount factor, εB is a shock on pref-
erence, Υ is a function including money in the utility function and σl is the Frish elasticity.
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The intertemporal elasticity of substitution is equal to one (log utility) for the model to be
consistent with long term growth, see King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1988).
Households face three constraints: the income constraint, the budget constraint and the
capital accumulation equation. The ﬁrst constraint corresponds to the decomposition of the
total revenue of households. Total revenue Y τt includes labor and capital revenues. Labor
revenue includes an insurance UIt thanks to which, ex post, the agents are identical concern-
ing employment. Capital revenue is diminished by a function of the utilization rate of capital
which stands for an adjustment cost in the capital utilization.
Y τt = (w
τ
t l
τ
t + UIt) + (r
k
t z
τ
tK
τ
t−1 − ψ(zτt )Kτt )
where wτt , r
k, Kτ and zτ are the wages, the renting cost of capital, the capital and the capital
utilization rate, respectively. Ψ(.) is the cost related to capital utilization. This function,
as in Christiano et al. (2005), is equal to zero at the steady state and convex. The budget
constraint of the household is as follows:
Mτt
Pt
+ bt
Bτt
Pt
=
Mτt−1
Pt
+
Bτt−1
Pt
+ Y τt − Cτt − Iτt
where Mτ , Pt, Bτ , bt and Iτ are the money, the price level, the savings (bonds), the saving
return rate and the investment, respectively. Let's turn to the capital dynamic equation.
Capital is depreciated with rate δ. Moreover, a function S( ItIt−1 ) stands for a cost of in-
vestment or the technology of converting investment into capital and It is a shock on the
investment cost or technology, the investment speciﬁc shock.
Kt = (1− δ)Kt−1 + It
(
1− S( It
It−1
)
)
It
On the labor market, households are wage setters and know the labor demand function
of ﬁrms. Labor of each household lτt is aggregated with Dixit-Stiglitz method into total labor
Lt, as in Erceg et al. (2000).
Lt =
(∫
(lτt )
1
1+λw,t
)1+λw,t
where λw,t is the wage mark-up, equal to a steady state value plus a wage mark-up shock
εW (t). Wages are set through a Calvo process. If not re-optimized, which happens with
probability ξw, wages are indexed on productivity growth,
At
At−1
, past inﬂation, pit−1 and the
central banker inﬂation target, pi∗t (with relative weight γW ).
On the capital market, households are capital owners and rent it to intermediate produc-
ers. The model introduces diﬀerent frictions on this market, an investment cost, S( ItIt−1 ), a
capital utilization cost, ψ(zτt )K
τ
t and a lag on capital utilization (Kt is used for production
at date t+ 1).
Intermediate ﬁrms and ﬁnal good producers
Intermediate ﬁrms (indexed by j) produce diﬀerentiated products with a Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function.
Y jt = K˜
α
t,j(AtLt,j)
1−α (2)
where K˜t,j = ztKt−1,j (respectively Lt,j) is the capital (resp. labor) used by ﬁrm j for pro-
duction at date t. Kt,j and Lt,j are undiﬀerentiated fractions of Kt and Lt respectively.
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At is the total factor productivity. It is modeled as an integrated process with a drift, to
account for economic growth.
At = At−1ea+εA(t) (3)
with a the average GDP growth and εA(t) the productivity shock.
Intermediate ﬁrms are also price setters. Their prices follow a Calvo process similar to
wages with parameters ξp and γp without indexation on productivity growth.
Regarding the ﬁnal good sector, ﬁrms produce an undiﬀerentiated good, Yt with input
Y jt with the technology:
Yt =
(∫
(Y jt )
1
1+λp,t
)1+λp,t
(4)
where λp,t is the price mark-up, equal to a steady state value plus a price mark-up shock εP (t).
Market clearing condition
This model is a closed economy model without ﬁscal policy. Hence, government expenditure,
together with trade balance, are aggregated into an exogenous expenditure shock εg(t) = Gt
in equation (5). National accounting gives the global demand of ﬁnal goods:
Yt = Ct + It +Gt + Ψ(zt)Kt−1 (5)
Monetary authority
Our sample includes a common monetary policy for the whole euro area also prior to the
foundation of the European Central Bank. The central banker sets the nominal interest
rate following a Taylor rule where the interest rate is a weighted average of national interest
rates before 1999 and the ECB interest rate afterwards. Gerlach and Schnabel (2000) have
shown that the European Monetary Union policy prior to the foundation of the ECB can be
described by a Taylor rule.
Rt = R
ρ
t−1
(
R∗t
(
pit
pi∗t
)rpi (YtAt−1
AtYt−1
)ry)1−ρ
Rt (6)
where pi∗t is the inﬂation target and R
∗
t , the targeted nominal interest rate (R
∗
t = R¯Rpi
∗
t with
R¯R the constant real interest rate targeted by the central banker). We model the inﬂation
target as an integrated process:
pi∗t = εpi(t)pi
∗
t−1 (7)
The shock εpi(t) enables to model possible structural break of inﬂation target. This feature
departs from the original time varying inﬂation target in Smets and Wouters (2003) which
was AR(1), and follows Ireland (2008) in the US and Fève et al. (2008) in the euro area. In
particular, it allows for a declining inﬂation target up to the mid 1990s, when central banks
where converging toward lower inﬂation levels and since the European Central Bank (ECB)
foundation, a constant inﬂation target, consistent with its objective. Contrary to Ireland
(2008), we choose not to include correlation between the innovation of inﬂation target and
other structural shocks, because in the Euro Area, the inﬂation target has to be related to
exogenous political decisions.
Finally, all shocks follow ﬁrst order autoregressive processes, except for the productivity
shock (εA) which is a white noise.
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2 Bayesian inference
In this section we brieﬂy detail and comment the data and the methodology used to estimate
deep parameters of the model presented above.
Data
We use the Area Wide Model data base (see Fagan et al. (2005)), complemented with data
from Eurostat, the OECD and the monthly bulletin of the European Central Bank. We
use eight series of Euro Area variables : real GDP, real Private Consumption, real Gross
Fixed Capital Formation, Total Compensation of Employees, Total Employment, Total La-
bor Force, Price Inﬂation calculated on the basis of the GDP Deﬂator and the short term
interest rate in the Euro area (Euribor 3 months). We further develop the construction of
our database in the Appendix.
Our model implies that real variables should share the same trend: the TFP trend. We
assume that TFP is a ﬁrst order integrated process with drift. This drift should be the
average growth rate of the real variables. Nevertheless, we empirically ﬁnd diﬀerences in the
average growth rate of real GDP and wages (see ﬁrst graph of ﬁgure 1). Indeed, the ratio of
wages to GDP has been slowly decreasing since 1992, which is incompatible with our model.
There is no such diﬀerence in the growth rate of wages and GDP in the US. This fact stems
from a speciﬁc trajectory of all countries before 1998. Yet, there has not been, as far as we
know, theoretical works which could reproduce this phenomenon with micro-foundations in
the framework. Hence, we choose to add some ad hoc trend-correction on the growth rate of
real wages.
Other authors have introduced the use of total employment as a proxy of hours worked
and an ad hoc function of transfer from employment to hours. We do not use this method and
do not use total employment as an observable, since the use of hours worked is incompatible
with standard DSGE model and needs further theoretical developments1.
We want to avoid any ﬁltering of the data prior to the estimation since potential prob-
lems for business cycle analysis arising for this approach have been exposed by many authors
(Cogley Nason (1995), Canova(1998,1999)). To extract as much information as possible from
the data, we use raw data as observable variables. Because real variables in levels are not
stationary in our model, we use the growth rates of GDP (dY ), GFCF (dI), private con-
sumption (dC) and real wages (dW ) as observable variables. The same argument with the
nominal trend (inﬂation target) instead of the real trend (TFP), justiﬁes the use of inﬂation
growth rate (dpi) as an observable variable. We also use the real interest rate (RRt = rt−pit)
which is stationary in our set-up.
As a result, observables are: [dY, dC, dI, dΠ, dW,RR].
1Adding employment data into the model with a non-microfounded transfer function from employment to
hours worked does not seem adequate in our approach, it would only cast doubts over our results. We leave
the development of the model to the labor market for further research.
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The following equations link input variables with stationary variables2:
dYt = ea(yˆt − yˆt−1 + εAt ) + a (8)
dCt = ea(cˆt − cˆt−1 + εAt ) + a (9)
dIt = ea(ˆit − iˆt−1 + εAt ) + a (10)
dWt = ea+errw(wˆt − wˆt−1 + εAt ) + a+ errw (11)
RRt = rˆt − pˆit − R¯R (12)
dΠt = pˆit − pˆit−1 + pi(t) (13)
where a is the TFP drift, errw is the trend-correction on wages, R¯R is the steady state value
of real interest rate, and pˆi is the ratio of inﬂation to the inﬂation target.
Priors and calibrations
Some parameters are calibrated to replicate standard stylized facts and ratios in the raw
data, which correspond to "the parameters that determine the steady state" of Del Negro
and Schorfheide (2008). Some other parameters are calibrated as in Smets and Wouters
(2003) because they are weakly identiﬁed and we prefer using common values rather than
introducing noise in the estimation. Calibrations are detailed in table 1. The other groups
of parameters mentioned by Del Negro and Schorfheide (2008), corresponding to "taste tech-
nology and policy parameters" on the one hand and "parameters describing the propagation
mechanism" on the other hand, are estimated through a Bayesian approach. We set a prior
for each structural parameter before the estimation3. Priors are detailed in table 2.
We follow Smets and Wouters (2003) for most priors, except for prior densities of standard
deviations and target inﬂation parameters. The usual prior density of standard deviation is
an inverse gamma; we choose Gaussian distributions to let the Markov Chain cover a larger
range of value45. Regarding the standard deviation of shocks, we set the prior densities equal
to likely values according to volatility of observable data. For example, the prior's mean for
the investment speciﬁc shock's standard deviation is set equal to 10%, comparable to the
price of investment volatility6. For the monetary policy shock standard deviation prior, we
use the deviation from a simple Taylor rule estimated outside the model. We set the mean
of the inﬂation target shock standard deviation prior equal to 0.01%, which corresponds to
the decrease of the HP-ﬁltered inﬂation from the mid 1980s to the mid 1990s. The standard
deviation of this prior is set to 0.01 to let the possibility of a constant inﬂation target.
3 Trends
In this section, we detail the rationale for our trends speciﬁcation. While Smets and Wouters
(2003) use an HP-ﬁlter to extract the cycle ex ante, Smets and Wouters (2005) and Sahuc
and Smets (2008) use a "deterministic growth rate driven by labor-augmenting technological
2These equations diﬀer from usual ones. We show in appendix on linearization, how using log linear
approximation implies a mixed ﬁrst and zero-order approximation with respect to the average growth rate a.
Approximation we don't want to make since a is a parameter.
3We use Dynare v4.0 and a Random Walk Metropolis Hastings with 600 000 draws to obtain the posterior
density.
4When we estimate our model with uniform or inverse gamma priors, it hardly modiﬁes the point estimates
and our ﬁndings remain unchanged.
5Gaussian densities allow for negative values, this is why some posterior densities, are bimodal on plus
and minus the standard deviation value, see for instance σW in ﬁgure 3
6See section 4 and Justiniano et al. (2008) for more details on the link between the investment speciﬁc
shock and the price of investment.
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progress" to detrend real variables. However, none of these papers include a nominal trend
simultaneously with a TFP trend. This feature of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve has
been investigated by Cogley and Sbordonne (2008). Recent papers do such inclusion in a
DSGE framework, as Ireland (2008) or Fève et al. (2008) but their models do not include
capital. Yet we expose here that investment dynamic is key in explaining cyclical ﬂuctuations
in the economy.
Rationale for an integrated productivity process
We have earlier introduced the TFP as a stochastic integrated process:
At = At−1ea+εA1(t)
At = A0eat+
∑t
i=0 εA1(i)
with εA1(t) a white noise shock.
Even though we are skeptical about modeling technological innovation as transitory, we
test the alternative speciﬁcation used by Smets and Wouters (2005,2007), a linear TFP with
autoregressive technology shock:
At = A0eat+εA2(t)
with εA2(t) an AR(1) shock. In order to test which assumption best ﬁts the data we introduce
both shocks, transitory and integrated, in the TFP:
At = A0eat+εA2(t)+
∑t
i=0 εA1(i)
By eliminating the transitory shock (resp. the permanent shock) we can test the ﬁt of each
set-up with the data.
A set-up with both shocks slightly deteriorates the marginal density (-301 against -300
for our integrated speciﬁcation).
Besides, the marginal density of the model with a linear trend and a non integrated process
is lower (-311), which implies that if I am agnostic over the choice of modelex ante, ex post I
will ﬁnd the integrated speciﬁcation 6× 104 times more likely than the autoregressive speci-
ﬁcation.
Only if our prior allows for very high persistence of the productivity shock, the marginal
density compares to our speciﬁcation (-302), in this case we ﬁnd the persistence of this shock
equal to 0.97, and the integrated speciﬁcation is still 7.4 times more likely than the autore-
gressive speciﬁcation.
Thus Bayesian analysis argues in favor of an integrated process.
In ﬁgure 9, we have a closer look at productivity. The graph shows both productivity
shocks, AR(1) (εA2(t)) and I(1) (
∑t
i=0 εA1(i)). It also shows the HP-trend of output cleared
from the linear trend of TFP.
As a matter of fact, when using HP-ﬁlters of the data, this HP-trend is actually the equiva-
lent of the productivity in our model.
First we see that the AR(1) and I(1) TFP are roughly consistent with raw data and a pure sta-
tistical ﬁlter. In fact, AR(1) and I(1) estimated TFP are very similar. However, compared
to HP-ﬁlters, other approaches reveal more information in sharper peaks of productivity.
Moreover, there is hardly one cycle of TFP over our sample, which corresponds to a per-
sistence close to one in the AR(1) speciﬁcation. It calls the AR(1) speciﬁcation into question.
Because of a better ﬁt to the data and because the AR(1) hypothesis leads to a highly
autocorrelated I(1)-shaped process, using an I(1) process to model TFP seems to be the best
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approach. This result is consistent with Ferroni (2008) estimation of the Smets and Wouters
model for the US.
Rationale for an integrated Inﬂation Target in the euro area
As far as the nominal trend is concerned, the political decision to tackle inﬂation in the 80s
as well as the well-known ECB's objective to maintain inﬂation "below but close to 2%"
economically justify our design of a moving inﬂation target: an integrated process for in-
ﬂation target allows it to decrease sharply in the 80s and be stable since 1999. However,
a simply I(1) inﬂation target has a drawback in a rational expectations framework: agents
do not anticipate after the Maastricht treaty the convergence toward lower inﬂation levels
which made the creation of the euro area possible. If one believes that the ECB objective of
inﬂation was anticipated at the beginning of the sample, one should prefer an AR(1) inﬂation
target as in Smets and Wouters (2003). On the other hand, it is hard to know whether the
success of the convergence process, and after of the ECB in maintaining a low inﬂation, has
been anticipated or not, even though the decision to lower inﬂation was made.
Thus, there are three alternatives left. A pure I(1) inﬂation target (Ireland (2008)),
agents cannot anticipate future levels of inﬂation target. An AR(1) inﬂation target (Smets
and Wouters (2003)). Or an integrated target where the innovation follows an AR(1) process
(Fève et al.(2008)). The third speciﬁcation allows for long term ﬂuctuation of inﬂation with
partial anticipation of future changes.
As for the real trend, we test all the speciﬁcations.
First, in the integrated inﬂation target set-up, we ﬁnd an autocorrelation coeﬃcient for the
inﬂation target innovation equal to 0.71, with a posterior density diﬀerent from the prior (see
graph 3). These ﬁndings rule out the purely I(1) speciﬁcation.
When using an autoregressive inﬂation target, marginal density decreases from −300 with
an integrated inﬂation target to −310, which implies that if I am agnostic over the choice of
model ex ante, ex post I will ﬁnd the integrated speciﬁcation 2× 104 times more likely than
the autoregressive speciﬁcation.
Using only autoregressive processes for both the inﬂation target and productivity deteri-
orates the marginal density to −316, the odd ratio is then 9× 106 in favor of the integrated
speciﬁcations.
In ﬁgure 11, the ﬁrst graph shows the inﬂation target derived from our model (in red)
compared to the inﬂation (black) and the Euribor 3 months (dotted black). The inﬂation
target eﬀectively follows the inﬂation, this ﬁnding is consistent with Ireland (2008) for the US
and Fève et al. (2008) for the euro area. Our inﬂation target captures the convergence toward
lower inﬂation levels through a sharp decrease of inﬂation target from 1992 to 1999. Then,
inﬂation target volatility is signiﬁcantly smaller which is consistent with the ECB mandate
for price stability. Actually, re-estimating our model on 1999-2008 sub-sample, divides by
almost ﬁve the standard deviation of the inﬂation target innovation (from 0.027 to 0.0064).
This small standard deviation implies a constant inﬂation target proﬁle. On this sub-sample,
the ﬁt to the data (marginal density) is exactly the same wether we calibrate the inﬂation
target shock constant or not. Hence, our model is able to conﬁrm a true structural break in
inﬂation target strategy through this integrated process7.
7Estimating on sub-samples implies no major change for deep parameters estimation. Hence we can
estimate our model on the whole period without fearing structural break of deep parameters and estimation
biases
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To conclude, the assumption of an integrated inﬂation target seems to be the most con-
sistent hypothesis in terms of economic and monetary history, as well as of ﬁt to the data.
Deﬁning the business cycle
Three levels of real variables dynamic introduced by the integrated TFP
When TFP is modeled by an integrated process with drift, it introduces three levels of dy-
namics, which are exempliﬁed in ﬁgure 10.
The ﬁrst graph illustrates the general shape of real GDP and our identiﬁcation of its
trend: the red line is the random walk described by TFP with its drift, while the black line
is real GDP. The gap between output and the productivity appears cyclical and relatively
small compared to historical range of GDP changes (less than 4% deviation). This ﬁrst graph
shows the ability of our model to replicate trended real variables.
The second ﬁgure shows the deviation of output and TFP from their deterministic trend.
The red line is the random walk described by TFP without its drift and the black line is
the output without its linear trend. According to our model, a shock on productivity has a
positive impact on real variables of 100% magnitude in the long term and we can see that the
accumulation of these shocks describes a long term cycle. Up to the mid 1990s, the produc-
tivity shocks are strictly and strongly positive, indicating a true upward trend of potential
production (4% above the linear trend). After 1994, they are negative, except around 2000
(the internet boom).
The third graph shows output over productivity extracted from our model. This compo-
nent of output is the business cycle. It is stationary. We can see that this variable is cyclical
and has a similar range of change to the long term ﬂuctuations of output induced by random
walk productivity (4%).
To sum up, we obtain a decomposition of ﬂuctuations into three parts of diﬀerent hori-
zon: a prominent long term linear trend, a long term ﬂuctuation induced by random walk
productivity and the business cycle (the resultant).
Two levels of dynamic for inﬂation and interest rate
Symmetrically, the integrated inﬂation target, since it has no drift, introduces two levels of
dynamic for the inﬂation and the interest rate, which are exempliﬁed in ﬁgure 11.
The ﬁrst graph shows the real values of inﬂation and interest rate and the estimated in-
ﬂation target. A shock on the inﬂation target has a permanent impact on both inﬂation and
interest rate. In particular, we can interpret a positive inﬂation target shock as a permanent
accommodative monetary policy shock, it positively impacts GDP.
The second and third graph show the business cycle of the inﬂation and the interest rate,
respectively. Inﬂation target shocks also have a transitory eﬀect on the business cycles of
both the inﬂation and the interest rate. This eﬀect is positive for inﬂation and negative for
interest rate, it is comparable to a negative monetary shock.
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4 Results' implications for the business cycle
Estimation results in our most probable speciﬁcation of the trends are presented in table 2,
while ﬁgures 3 and 4 depict the prior and posterior densities of the estimated parameters and
show the quality of the estimation. In these graphs, the prior density is represented in grey,
the posterior density in black and the posterior mode in green. One can check that the mode
corresponds to the posterior mode and that the posterior distribution has a lower variance
than the prior except for the Frish elasticity, σl and the weight of inﬂation in the Taylor rule,
rpi which are often weakly identiﬁed. Regarding the structural parameters, our results are
generally similar to the ones found in literature. We ﬁnd a smaller indexation of prices and
wages on past inﬂation than Smets and Wouters (2003), but our results are very similar to
those of Feve et al. (2008), who use the same indexation on both past inﬂation and current
inﬂation target and also close to Sahuc and Smets (2008) and Smets and Wouters (2007).
The Calvo parameter on prices is larger than the Calvo parameter on wages which is also
found by Smets and Wouters (2003), Fève et al. (2008) and Sahuc and Smets (2008).
While our estimates are in line with the literature, we identify two main diﬀerences in
the economic transmission mechanisms in our model. First, a larger internal persistence
than what is usually found, second a diﬀerent set of shocks driving the short term economic
ﬂuctuations.
Internal persistence
As in the data, we ﬁnd strong persistence of the endogenous variables: 0.96 for GDP, invest-
ment and consumption, 0.99 for capital, 0.94 for labor, 0.92 for the interest rate, and 0.67
for inﬂation. This persistence is induced by the economic model rather than by the shocks.
Indeed, on the investment speciﬁc shock and the preference shock we have much smaller
persistence (0.17, 0.38, respectively) than Smets and Wouters (2003, 2005), Sahuc and Smets
(2008) who ﬁnd them around 0.9. Also we ﬁnd no need to use ARMA processes to avoid
unit roots on mark-up shocks as in Smets and Wouters (2007) and Sahuc and Smets (2008).
The residual demand shock has the highest persistence (0.94), this value is logically close to
the persistence of endogenous variables mentioned above since this shock embodies the rest
of the world and this is consistent with the literature. In comparison with the literature, we
ﬁnd a much higher habit formation parameter, which partly accounts for the high persistence
of the model anyhow.
Sources of ﬂuctuation at business cycle frequencies
Table 3 documents the decomposition of each endogenous variables' variance in terms of
shocks and enables to understand what are the main sources of the ﬂuctuations.
Nominal ﬂuctuations stem from price and wage mark-up shocks; however, contrary to
Smets and Wouters (2003 and 2005), we ﬁnd no role for price mark-up shocks and a small
role for wage mark-up shocks in real variables' business cycle (see columns 5 and 8 in ta-
ble 3). For instance, wage mark-up shock, respectively price mark-up shock, only explains
11%, respectively 0% of GDP.
Turning to the productivity shock (ﬁrst column, table 3), contrary to RBC supporters,
we ﬁnd a little role for productivity in explaining both the real and nominal variables' busi-
ness cycle. For instance, GDP ﬂuctuations are driven for only 5% by productivity shock, for
inﬂation and interest rate, these ﬁgures are 0% and 2%, respectively. Overall, only a few
percentage points of variance are due to one of these shocks and none of them is the main
12
source of variance for any variable8.
The inﬂation target shock (sixth column) also have a negligible impact on both the real
and nominal variables' cycle. It accounts for 2% of the GDP business cycle and for the
inﬂation and the interest rate, 0% and 2%, respectively.
Actually, we ﬁnd a linchpin role for the investment shock in cyclical ﬂuctuations. It
accounts for 22% of GDP, 84% of capital. This ﬁnding is consistent with the recent ﬁnd-
ings of Justiniano et al. (2008), but also Greenwood et al.(1997) or Fischer (2002), who ﬁnd
that investment speciﬁc shocks explain a large part of GDP ﬂuctuations in the United-States.
Ferroni (2008) ﬁnd similar results: a little role for productivity shocks, central investment
speciﬁc shocks in a one-step approach. He also ﬁnd that mark-up shocks can be important
sources of ﬂuctuation, but under the less likely speciﬁcations of the trend.
In addition to the investment speciﬁc shock, we ﬁnd that 40% of consumption's business
cycle is driven by the preference shock.
This shock is a wedge in the Euler equation on consumption. Canzoneri et al. (2007) have
estimated on US data the interest rate from this equation without wedge. They ﬁnd that
the interest rate which should explain ﬂuctuations in private consumption is negatively cor-
related to the monetary policy instrument. Hence, consumption being driven by preference
shocks is not surprising and argues in favor of "animal spirit" as an important source of the
business cycle.
The prevalence of investment speciﬁc shocks and preference shock in explaining the busi-
ness cycle also translates in the historical decomposition of endogenous variables. Figure 13
exempliﬁes the domination of preference shocks over private consumption's business cycle
(second graph), while the investment speciﬁc shock explains the investment business cycle
(third graph). The two combined play a major role for the GDP (ﬁrst graph).
On the shocks driving the cycle and their structural characteristics
As the preference shock and the investment speciﬁc shock are central in understanding the
cycle, we broaden the study by testing the ability of these shocks to match their deﬁnition.
First the preference shock aﬀects the subjective discount rate of households and can be in-
terpreted as their conﬁdence in the future. To illustrate its identiﬁcation, we compare it with
the conﬁdence indicator of the households in the euro area published by the European Com-
mission. The correlation with the preference shock is equal to 0.26 which is non-negligible.
Because the estimated preference shocks are more volatile than the conﬁdence indicators, we
provide moving average of this time series on 4 quarters. The correlation of the synthetical
conﬁdence indicator with the smoothed preference shock is equal to 0.29. A regression of the
smoothed preference shock on the diﬀerent items of the conﬁdence indicator (General eco-
nomic situation over last 12 months, General economic situation over next 12 months, Price
trends over next 12 months, Unemployment expectations over next 12 months, Statement
on ﬁnancial situation of household) explains 69% of the smoothed preference shock variance.
Figure 14 shows these time series. Hence, the preference shock we estimate cannot be said
to be orthogonal to the measurement of households' conﬁdence.
8The fact that productivity shocks account for 46% of volatility in wage growth variance reﬂects our
assumption of perfect indexation of real wages on productivity.
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Regarding the investment speciﬁc shock, it describes the conversion of one unit of in-
vestment into capital. One may interpret it as the combined eﬀects of a shock aﬀecting the
transformation of consumption into investment goods (the relative price of investment) and
a shock describing the diﬃculty of ﬁrms to ﬁnance their investment. A key question consists
in disentangling the two components of this shock9
First, we follow Greenwood et al. (2000), Fisher (2006), Justiniano et al. (2008) and compare
the investment speciﬁc shock with the inﬂation of investment relative to GDP inﬂation using
the time series of the AWM database. Figure 15 shows this comparison. Both time series
exhibit high volatility and their correlation is equal to 0.20, which is again non-negligible.
We also compare the investment speciﬁc shock with the spread BBB-OAT since 2000 for the
non-ﬁnancial corporate rate published by Merrill Lynch. We ﬁnd a clear negative correlation
of the investment speciﬁc shock with the BBB corporate rate equal to −0.30.
We then have evidence showing that the investment speciﬁc shock embodies market con-
ditions of investment: relative inﬂation of investment goods and risk premium for external
ﬁnancing.
As a conclusion, the comparisons between these two shocks and some related time series
show that one can not reject the hypothesis that these shocks satisfactorily replicate structural
shocks in the economy.
5 Booms and busts under the scope of historical decom-
position
In this section, we provide an illustration of the credibility of our model and our identiﬁcation
of shocks. To this aim, we turn to the historical decomposition of variables in terms of shocks
(ﬁgure 12 for GDP growth, inﬂation and interest rate, ﬁgure 13 for GDP, consumption and
investment) and the interpretation it gives for the economic history of the euro area since
1985.
Up to the 1993 recession and the Maastricht treaty
In the beginning of the sample we estimate negative and persistent contribution of the resid-
ual demand shock (in pale blue). This contribution can be interpreted as the combination of
2 facts.
First in 1985, the exchange rate between US dollar and the Deutsche Mark was quite high.
Hence, the DM and other European currencies pegged on it were relatively appreciated with
respect to the US dollar and the trade balance between the euro area and its ﬁrst commercial
partner was small (see graph 2 in ﬁgure 16). As the currencies depreciated in the late 1980s
and early 1990s, the trade balance became larger.
Second, European governments started coordinated policies of reducing government expen-
ditures in order to create the European Union (see graph 1 in ﬁgure 16). The Maastricht
treaty was written in 1992, it was adopted in 1994.
The two combined have a depressionary impact on the euro area which translates in our
model through a negative contribution to GDP of the residual demand shock.
The German reuniﬁcation, and the exchange rate crisis
From 1991 to 1993, monetary policy is very restrictive (deviation from the average Taylor
rule is in orange). Indeed, the German reuniﬁcation induced a huge inﬂow of liquidity in the
9Justiniano et al. (2009) have investigated this shock for the US. They show that the investment speciﬁc
shock is mainly explained by its ﬁnancial part.
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German economy in 1990. To counter the inﬂationist risks, the Bundesbank implemented
a restrictive monetary policy starting the second half of 1991. Other European countries,
for fear of having their currency depreciated against the Deutsche Mark, tightened their
monetary policy as well. On top of that, protection against speculative attacks forced some
countries (for instance UK in July 1992, Italy in September 1992, Spain and Portugal in
November 1992, Ireland in February 1993 ...) to temporarily increase their rates even more.
Thus, this huge positive deviation from the Taylor rule have a clear depressionary impact
on GDP according to our estimates. Up to 1993, it is somewhat counterbalanced by pref-
erence shocks, investment speciﬁc shocks and in a smaller extent wage mark up shock. But
in 1993, preference shocks and investment speciﬁc shocks were such that their positive eﬀect
on GDP was reduced to almost zero while at the same time, productivity started declining.
Simultaneously the eﬀect of mark up shock on GDP (in red) inverted and became negative
amplifying the crisis. Yet, monetary policy stayed restrictive for another three years (positive
deviation from the Taylor rule) even though its contribution to growth became positive dur-
ing 1992-1993. Monetary policy went back to the Taylor rule in 1994 but the discretionary
deviation from it never became really accommodative.
The diﬃcult situation for monetary policy coordination in the euro area may explain the
slow ease of monetary policy in front of the 1993 crisis. Gerlach and Schnabel (2000) have
shown for instance that, between 1992 and 1993, the interest rate of the European Monetary
Union (EMU) has signiﬁcatively departed from its usual Taylor rule. In the early nineties,
the European Monetary System (EMS) faced numerous devaluation and revaluation of its
currencies. All currencies have suﬀered from a reconsideration of their parity with the DM
except the ﬂorin, which took advantage of a perfectly aligned macroeconomic policy with
Germany. The pound sterling and the Italian lire even left the EMS in 1992. In this context,
the EMS was weakened and its ﬂuctuation margin was dramatically increased to ±15%. In
addition, the policies directed toward the convergence to low inﬂation levels added to the
restrictiveness of monetary policy from 1992 to 1999, which deepened the recessionary eﬀect of
monetary policy (inﬂation target shock in yellow, ﬁrst graph of ﬁgure 13). Quantitatively, the
inﬂation target during 1993 had a negative impact on GDP growth (-0.30% in annual growth).
Even if this quantitative impact is lower than the investment speciﬁc shock (−1.24%) or the
preference shock (−0.72%) for the same period, it remains comparable to GDP growth (-
0.41%).
Climax in 2000 and collapse
This period was characterized by a succession of events.
First the Asian crisis in the late nineties had by contagion a recessionary impact in Eu-
rope. Its eﬀect translates to the residual demand shock which includes the trade balance.
We identify a small contraction from 1998-Q3 to 2000-Q3 preceeding the dot-com bubble
which is consistent with a contraction of the trade balance at the same period (see graph 2
in ﬁgure 16).
Second, during the dot-com bubble, we identify the GDP growth as the combination of a
positive investment speciﬁc shock and an increase in productivity (gains in productivity and
cheap/eﬃcient investment) with an almost neutral monetary policy. When the dot-com bub-
ble bursts in 2001, we ﬁnd a slowdown in productivity growth (see second graph of ﬁgure 10)
and a shift in the investment speciﬁc shock which became recessionary. As a consequence of
this crisis the governments' deﬁcits in the euro area increased dramatically. This automatic
stabilizer can explain the temporary positive eﬀect of residual demand shock, see graph 1 in
ﬁgure 16 and is reinforced by an improvement of the trade balance as shown on graph 2 of
the same ﬁgure.
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Third, the 9-11 attacks negatively impacted households conﬁdence tremendously and might
be responsible for the further decline in consumption growth in the third and fourth quarter
of 2001 and the ﬁrst quarter of 2002. The historical decomposition of output shows that
households' conﬁdence (preference shock) had a positive impact on GDP as the dot-com
bubble grew, but this eﬀect shifted in the fourth quarter of 2001 just after the terrorist at-
tacks in USA.
Meanwhile monetary policy shocks were expansionary and signiﬁcantly contributed to
reduce the contraction.
The subprime crisis
In the summer 2007, the subprime bubble burst in USA aﬀecting all the other economies
mainly by the end of 2008. In the euro area, GDP growth is at its minimum over our sample
in the fourth quarter 2008. According to our estimates, a strong recessionary impact of both
the preference shock and the investment speciﬁc shock explain this large decrease in GDP
growth. As we have shown above, we can interpret the negative preference shock as the
collapse of the households' conﬁdence, while the investment speciﬁc shock embodies ﬁnancial
market situation, among others, a channel which, with no doubt, faced a major negative
shock during the subprime crisis.
The monetary policy has become accommodative only in the fourth quarter 2008 corre-
sponding to the fact that the ECB decided to decrease its main reﬁnancing interest rate only
in October 2008. This delay is the result of an upward risk on inﬂation as well as uncertainty
during this period. Indeed, the euro area has experienced inﬂationary shocks interpreted by
our model as wage and price mark-up shocks instead of shocks on energy prices and com-
modity prices since 2007-Q1 as ﬁgure 12 shows.
This historical decomposition highlights the ability of our model to re-enact major events
of the recent period for the Euro Area and enhances the credibility of our estimates.
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Linearized Model
Linearized observation equations
Let Xt be a real trended variable of the economy (GDP, investment, consumption or wages).
Note X˜t = Xt/At the corresponding stationary variable.
X¯ is the variable's steady steady and Xˆt is the rate of deviation of X˜t from its steady state
value.
Xˆt = (X˜t − X¯)/X¯ or log(X˜t)− log(X¯) with a ﬁrst order approximation.
We recall that productivity veriﬁes At = At−1ea+εA(t) and productivity shocks εA is AR(1).
The growth rate of Xt is our observable. The following equations link it to the stationary
variables taken in deviation from their steady state values which are the variables used for
computations.
dXt =
Xt −Xt−1
Xt−1
dXt =
X˜t ∗At − X˜t−1 ∗At−1
X˜t−1 ∗At−1
dXt =
ea+εa(t)(1 + Xˆt)− (1 + Xˆt−1)
1 + Xˆt−1
dXt =
ea(1 + εa(t))(1 + Xˆt)− (1 + Xˆt−1)
1 + Xˆt−1
+ o(ε2a)
dXt = (ea − 1) + ea ∗ (Xˆt − Xˆt−1 + εa(t)) + o(Xˆ2, ε2a)
As a consequence, the following equation, which is used by other authors,
dXt = Xˆt − Xˆt−1 + εa(t) + a
is an approximation of the equation above with a, the average growth rate, close to zero. It
is false for two reasons: it is an approximation with respect to a parameter in addition to
variables, it is a mixed ﬁrst-order/zero-order approximation.
Yet a being very small, such a mistake does not cast much doubts on the results found
with this method.
Others observables are the growth rate of inﬂation, and the real interest rate.
Before linearization, the model uses the variables Rt = 1 + rt and Πt = 1 + pit where rt and
pit are interest rate and inﬂation rate.
Rt/Π∗t and Πt/Π
∗
t are the stationary variables. We write rˆt and pˆit their deviation rate from
steady state value.
Thus, the following equations link the real interest rate and the growth rate of inﬂation to
the stationary variables.
RRt = rt − pit = rˆt − pˆit − R¯R
dpit = pˆit − pˆit−1 + pi(t)
where R¯R is the steady state value of the real interest rate and pi the inﬂation target shock.
Steady State equations
Output in national accounting
y¯ = c¯+ i¯+ g¯ (14)
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Output as ﬁnal production
y¯ = z¯αk¯αL¯1−αe−αa − Φ (15)
Marginal utility of households
β
R¯
Π¯
= ea (16)
Capital dynamic
i¯
k¯
= 1− e−a(1− δ) (17)
Tobin-Q and investment maximization program
1 = Q¯(1 + S(ea)− eaS′(ea)) + βe−aQ¯e2aS′(ea) (18)
with S(ea) = 0 = S′(ea) (19)
gives Q¯ = 1 (20)
Q¯ = βe−a(Q¯(1− δ) + r¯kz¯) (21)
knowing Q¯ = 1 = z¯ (22)
gives r¯k =
ea
β
+ δ − 1 (23)
Capital utilization rate and rental cost
r¯k = ψ′(z¯) (24)
with z¯ = 1 (25)
czcap =
ψ¯′′
ψ¯′
(26)
Marginal cost of production
M¯C = w¯1−α(r¯k)α(α−α(1− α)α−1) (27)
Constant ratio of factors remuneration
w¯L¯ =
1− α
α
r¯kz¯k¯e−a (28)
Price setting
1 = ξpp¯i
1−γp
λ¯p + (1− ξp) ¯˜Π
1
λ¯p (29)
(1 + λ¯p)M¯C =
¯˜Πδ¯Π(γp−1)(T−1−t) (30)
knowing Π¯∗ = 1. we ﬁnd δ¯Π = 1
Wage setting
w¯
1
λ¯w = ξww¯
1
λ¯w + (1− ξw) ¯˜w
1
λ¯w (31)
hence w¯ = ¯˜w
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Dynamic equations
Output in national accounting
yˆt = ccons cˆt + cinv iˆt + εg(t) +
cinv e−a
1− e−a(1− δ) (
ea
β
+ δ − 1) zˆt (32)
Output as ﬁnal production
yˆt = (1 + φy)(αzˆt + αkˆt−1 + (1− α)Lˆt − α εa(t)) (33)
Households' maximization program
cˆt =
h
ea + h
cˆt−1+
ea
ea + h
cˆt+1− h
ea + h
εa(t)+
ea
ea + h
εa(t+1)+
ea − h
ea + h
(εb(t)−εb(t+1)−(rˆt−pˆit+1−εpi∗(t))
(34)
Tobin-Q
Qˆt = −rˆkt + pˆit+1 + pˆi∗t+1 + (1− δ)βe−aQˆt+1 + (1− (1− δ)βe−a)rˆkt+1 (35)
Investment maximisation program
iˆt =
1
1 + β
(
iˆt−1 + βiˆt+1 +
e2a
S′′(ea)
(Qˆt + εˆIt )− εa(t) + βεa(t+ 1)
)
(36)
Capital utilization rate and rental cost
rˆkt = czcap zˆt (37)
Marginal cost of production
MˆCt = (1− α)wˆt + αrˆkt (38)
Constant ratio of factors remuneration
wˆt + Lˆt = rˆkt (1 +
1
czcap
) + kˆt−1 − εa(t) (39)
Phillips curve
pˆit − γppˆit−1 + γpεΠ∗(t) = βea(pˆit+1 − γppˆit + γpεΠ∗(t+ 1))
+
(1− βξpea)(1− ξp)
ξp
[MˆCt +
λ¯pλˆp,t
1 + λ¯p
]
(40)
Wage Phillips curve
wˆt−wˆt−1 + pˆit − γwpˆit−1 + γwεΠ∗(t) = β(wˆt+1 − wˆt + pˆit+1 − γwpˆit + γwεΠ∗(t+ 1))
+
(1− ξw)(1− ξwβ)
ξw(1 + σl 1+λ¯wλ¯w )
(−wˆt + σl lˆt + λ¯wλˆw,t1 + λ¯w
− εb(t) + cˆt − he
−a(cˆt−1 − εa(t))
1− he−a )
(41)
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Data
The updating of the AWM database was achieved as follows:
Real GDP, private consumption and GFCF were extrapolated using the growth of the cor-
responding Eurostat series.
Inﬂation was simply completed with Eurostat data.
Total compensation of employees and total employment were extrapolated using the growth
of the corresponding series published in the monthly bulletin of the European Central Bank.
Total labor force was completed using the OECD series of unemployment rate and the ex-
trapolated series of Total employment.
Our data cover the 1985 Q1 to 2008 Q4 period for Euro Area (16 countries).
The model evades the labor market, it is then based on the modeling of the labor force
to explain the economy. In others words, the question of participation to the labor market
is voluntarily left aside and any consumer or household is a worker. In order to model a
representative household in this framework, we divided the extensive data (real GDP, pri-
vate consumption and GFCF) by the total labor force. As a consequence, these per capita
variables must be handled with care while commenting the results since they overestimate
the real value which would be divided by the total population.
Regarding the labor market variables, the correspondence between data and the model is
more complicated.
In the model, households are wage setters and ﬁrms adjust their labor demand to this
wage level. Hence, the best deﬁnition of wage would be the wage per hour worked. Not
having at our disposal the series of total hours worked, we use the series of total employment
as its proxy and calculate the wage per employment.
When eluding the question of the labor market, we make an even stronger assumption: by
hypothesis, there is no unemployment in the model. The diﬃculty to overcome then, is the
correct deﬁnition of labor supply and demand at equilibrium. To model the labor market,
Smets & Wouters (following Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans 2005) stated the existence of
a perfect insurance against unemployment and labor income variation using state-contingent
securities which ex-post guarantees that the labor income of each household matches the
aggregate labor income. As a consequence, all members of the labor force can be treated
equally.
Usually, labor in this model is total hours worked. From this deﬁnition of employment, we
ﬁrst followed Smets & Wouters (2003) to derive the total hours worked through a "Calvo"
process. Yet, the series of total employment introduced to much non stationarity and we
ﬁnally abandoned the employment as an observed variable.
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parameter value comments
Cobb-Douglas param. α 0.34 corresponds to yields of capital to output ratio
households discount factorβ 0.9926 compatible with steady state equation
capital depreciation rate δ 0.025 as in Smets & Wouters (2003)
SS cons. share in GDP ccons 0.57 equal to average ratio in the data
SS invest. share in GDP cinv 0.21 equal to average ratio in the data
SS wage mark-up λw 0.1 weakly identiﬁed, set as Feve et al. (2008)
SS price mark-up λp 0.2 unidentiﬁed, set as Feve et al. (2008)
SS real interest rate R¯R 0.4762 equal to average value
Table 1: Parameters calibration
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Shocks contribution to each variable cyclical dynamic
prod. pref. res. demand invest. price m-u inﬂ. targ. mon. pol. wage m-u
GDP 5 20 14 22 0 2 26 11
Cons 14 40 6 25 0 1 10 4
Invest. 1 9 5 61 0 1 13 8
Capital 4 6 3 78 0 0 4 4
Cap. rent. cost 3 11 7 72 0 0 5 3
Euribor 0 7 5 6 4 2 62 14
Labour 3 25 17 16 0 2 25 12
Wage 2 5 3 51 7 0 4 28
Tobin-Q 0 1 1 5 2 5 75 9
Inﬂation 0 5 3 2 33 2 31 24
Marg. Cost 0 3 2 2 20 1 12 61
GDP growth 2 32 29 28 0 1 6 1
cons. growth 1 96 0 0 0 0 2 0
invest. growth 0 1 1 86 0 1 8 3
wage growth 49 0 0 1 17 0 0 33
real interest rate 0 1 0 1 11 3 78 6
inﬂation growth 0 1 1 0 76 2 6 13
Table 3: Variance decomposition of our baseline model estimated on the 1985-2008 period
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Figure 1: Long term evolution of wages over GDP and employment rate
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Observable variables
Estimated innovations
Figure 2: Input (observable variables) and output (shock innovations)
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Figure 3: Priors and posteriors of our baseline model estimation on 1985 2008 period -MH:
1 million iterations and 4 chains (1/2)
28
Figure 4: Priors and posteriors of our baseline model estimation on 1985 2008 period -MH:
1 million iterations and 4 chains (2/2)
29
Price mark-up shock
Wage mark-up shock
Investment speciﬁc shock
Figure 5: IRF of our baseline model to the oﬀer shocks: price mark-up shock, wage mark-up
shock and investment cost shock
30
Households' preference shock
Government spending shock
Figure 6: IRF of our baseline model to the demand shocks: households' preference shock and
government spending shock
31
Productivity shock
Figure 7: IRF of our baseline model to the productivity shock
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Monetary policy shock
Inﬂation target shock
Figure 8: IRF of our baseline model to the monetary shocks: monetary policy shock and
inﬂation target shock
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Figure 9: Comparison of integrated processes estimated by the model and corresponding
variables
34
Output (in log)
Output cleared from deterministic trend on TFP
Output divided by TFP (stationary variable)
Figure 10: Three levels of dynamic on real variables
35
Inﬂation and interest rate, quarterly values
Deviation of inﬂation from inﬂation target
Deviation of interest rate from inﬂation target
Figure 11: Two levels of dynamic on inﬂation and interest rate
36
GDP growth
Inﬂation
Interest rate
Figure 12: Historical decomposition of macroeconomic time series : output growth, inﬂation
and interest rate
37
GDP
Private Consumption
GFCF
Figure 13: Historical decomposition of macroeconomic time series: GDP, consumption and
investment
38
Figure 14: Comparison of the preference shock with the conﬁdence indicator of households
39
Comparison of the investment speciﬁc shock with the relative inﬂation of investment
Comparison of the investment speciﬁc shock with the conﬁdence indicator of entrepreneurs
Figure 15: Comparison of the investment speciﬁc shocks with related indicators
40
Figure 16: Government expenditures and trade balance for the EA
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